


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COPY NO. 1 SERIES A 55

From : U. S. Mission Berlin

Ref.

Subject: Transmission of USAREUR prepared paper to Berlin (U)

(U) Attached is a paper entitled "Berlin Estimate" prepared by intelligence officers of USAREUR setting forth an appraisal of the Berlin situation. USBER was requested by Col. Charles E. Johnson, Chief of Staff USOCB, to comment on the paper and a copy of USBER's comments is also attached.

For the Assistant Chief of Mission:

Findley Burys, Jr.
Findley Burys, Jr.
Chief
Political Affairs Section

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NND 901030*
By *HR-m/SG*, MARA, Date *6/30/91*

OASD(PA) DFOISR	36
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No. <i>R2</i>	
Case No. <i>90-FCI-1759</i>	
T.S. No. <i>90-TS-190</i>	
Document No. <i>2</i>	

Enclosures:

As stated.

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REQUIREMENT:

1. USAREUR Course of Action

* Another complication of the right to the air access to Berlin would be the Soviet and/or East German insistence that all commercial airlines use the Schoenefeld Airport, located in East Berlin, and that the right to overfly was subject to high level negotiations with the government of the respective commercial airlines.

(U) Situation 6. Soviets withdraw from BASC

Soviets withdraw their personnel from the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) and replace same with (1) East German deputised to act in their behalf, or (2) East Germans designated as representatives of a sovereign East German state.

US refuses to accept East Germans and Soviets refuse to guarantee safety of aircraft flying in/out of Berlin.

REQUIREMENT:

1. USAREUR course of action

(U) Situation 7. Block military Land Line Cables

The Soviets prohibit the use of all military land line cables from West Berlin to West Germany and demand Allies and/or West Germany conclude specific agreement on subject with the East German government.

REQUIREMENT:

1. USAREUR course of action

2. Signal SOP

(U) Situation 8. Apprehension of US Military Personnel

Several US military personnel on authorized pass in East Berlin are apprehended by East German Police on charges of disorderly conduct. Concurrent with the arrest the Soviets announced the dissolution of the Soviet Berlin Kommandatura. East Germans insist that US authorities must deal directly with East Berlin police for the release of the military personnel.

REQUIREMENT:

1. USAREUR course of action (policy)

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(U) A US Army military train (Frankfurt to Berlin) transporting cargo and personnel to/(from) Berlin is detained by the Soviets at Magdeburg. Soviets insist on (1) "Right" to inspect cargo and (2) new documentation procedures. US Army personnel refuse to accept Soviet documentation procedures, or allow inspection of cargo. Soviets refuse to allow train to proceed until inspection is completed and documentation procedures accepted.

REQUIREMENTS:

1. USAREUR Course of Action (policy)
2. USAREUR policy guidance to [CG]USCOB

* As pointed out in Situation 2, this problem could be complicated by other factors such as:

- (U) 1. Arbitrary points of detention along the route, irrespective of the direction of travel.
- (U) 2. "Deputized" or "Sovereign" East Germans accomplishing the detention.
- (U) 3. Absence of Soviet contacts at Karlshorst.
- (U) 4. Use of military force to accomplish detention.

Situation 4. Implementation of "Sovereign" Treaty Agreement

(U) The Soviets announce complete implementation of the Soviet/East German treaty of Sovereignty of Sep 55, stating that henceforth the control over the travel of personnel and the traffic in goods pertaining to the three western garrisons over the Berlin Helmstedt Autobahn, the rail lines and the three air corridors, are now the function of a Sovereign East Germany.

REQUIREMENTS:

1. USAREUR policy reference future courses of action
2. Instructions to [CG]USCOB

Situation 5. East German Permission to Fly Corridors *

(U) Soviets insist that US obtain East German "permission" to fly the air corridors. In the face of US refusal, Soviets interfere with our flights by use of unauthorized flights of Soviet and East German aircraft and balloon type obstacles.

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Situation 1. Soviets withdraw from East Berlin

(U) The Soviets unilaterally withdraw their troops and functions from East Berlin, to include the abolishment of the Soviet Kommandatura, at Karlshorst, i.e., remove present US channel and point of contact with the Soviets.

REQUIREMENT:

1. USAREUR policy reference future courses of action
2. Instructions to [CG]USCOB

Situation 2. Soviets detain military convoy

(U) A US Army convoy (plural number of military vehicles), transitting the autobahn from Berlin, is detained by Soviet personnel at the Babelsberg (Berlin checkpoint).

REQUIREMENTS:

1. USAREUR courses of action
2. USAREUR policy guidance to [CG]USCOB

▪ Apart from the basic issue involved, i.e., detention of the convoy, there are many combinations and permutations of this situation. For example:

- (U) 1. The Soviets could detain the convoy either at Berlin, Marienborns, or at any arbitrary point along the route.
- (U) 2. "Deputized" East Germans (accredited Soviet agents) could detain the convoy.
- (U) 3. "Sovereign" East Germans (complete control transferred by Soviets) could detain the convoy.
- (U) 4. The Soviets may or may not be present in East Berlin to serve as a point of US contact, i.e., Soviet withdrawal from Karlshorst.
- (U) 5. Soviet forces alone, in combination with East German forces, or East German forces alone, may act as the detaining force.
- (U) 6. Single vehicles as well as open, unloaded, uncovered vehicles could be stopped and detained.
- (U) 7. The point of contention could be either the question of "documentation" and/or "inspections".
- (U) 8. Situation could ensue as the result of travel in either E-W or W-E directions.

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(U) The Soviet proposal for a turnover of Berlin will be a formal proposal for Allied as well as Soviet turnover. This may well be contained within a broader proposal for a Four Power meeting to negotiate a German peace treaty.

(12) (U) c. The Soviets will proceed gradually and with caution in their efforts to turn over control of Allied access to Berlin to the East Germans, attempting to appear reasonable rather than provocative. This means a step by step procedure using "deputized" East Germans rather than an abrupt and total turnover of control.

(U) d. The Soviets are prepared to accept a minor armed clash between US and East German personnel, but only under circumstances which do not put the Soviets in an aggressive or threatening light and so long as the issue raised is not serious enough to provoke the US into war. The Soviet objective would be to underline the necessity for a settlement of the existing dangerous situation without compromising the desired image of willingness to reach a settlement.

(U) e. The Soviets may well attempt to substitute a "deputized" East German for the Soviet representative on the Berlin Air Safety Center and, in the event of Allied refusal, disclaim responsibility for air safety in the Allied air corridors. We believe, however, that neither the Soviets nor the East Germans will resort to outright attacks against Allied aircraft flying within the air corridors although harassment will probably occur.

(U) f. We consider it doubtful that the Soviets or East Germans will institute a blockade against the flow of West German goods and persons between West Germany and Berlin.

(U) g. Military attack against West Berlin, by either the Soviets or East Germans, is extremely improbable.

(U) h. A Soviet or East German blockade of land access to Berlin by Allied forces is improbable. By blockade we mean an unconditional refusal to allow passage.

(U) i. Soviets or "deputized" East Germans will continue to harass Allied land passage by demands for inspections on an irregular and unpredictable schedule. We believe, furthermore, that the chances for a repetition of the 14 November detention episode are good.

(U) j. Allied land telephone communications will not be severed or impeded.

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The only areas in which the Soviets appeared to maintain four-power control was in keeping open the intersector borders and the borders around the city's periphery; the only other area, in which they dealt until now with the Western Commandants, was in cases involving allied military personnel.

(U) In this connection present East German control over non-military traffic between West Berlin and West Germany is of interest. On 1 May 1955, almost five months before the treaty of "sovereignty" was signed, the East Germans initiated tolls on Autobahn travel; on the same day in 1958, a tax was also levied on canal traffic. It is apparent that these measures were intended to force the W. Germans into government-level negotiations, as well as to raise much-needed hard currency. Protests by the part of Allied authorities to the Soviets that this was an infringement on free access to Berlin, was rejected with the usual reference to East German sovereignty.

(U) 6. US troops and supplies of the Berlin garrisons, in the event of Soviet turn-over of control, could be moved into and out of Berlin subject to East German check. It is quite probable, that once the Soviets and the East Germans realize that the Western allies will stay in Berlin, they will attempt to levy highway and canal tolls on military traffic, and even to collect levies for use of the air corridors.

(U) Short of complete breaking of contacts with Soviets, US Liaison mission would not be affected. The Mission is accredited to the CINC GSFG on a reciprocal basis, in a document known as the Huebner-Malinin agreement signed in 1947. This is not a part of the Berlin problem proper. Assuming that the Soviets are unwilling to lose the reciprocal rights they enjoy in West Germany, an entry and exit route would be authorized, provided Berlin could no longer be used as an access point.

3. (U) Conclusions:

(U) (10) (U) a. The Soviets will, in the very near future, extend East German "sovereignty" to East Berlin and publicly turn over Soviet functions in East Berlin to the East Germans. The principal consequences of this action for us are:

(U) (1) Subjection of US personnel traveling in East Berlin to East German arrest and detention. (This is not applicable to USMLM personnel since they are accredited to the Commander, GSFG).

(U) (2) Disappearance of official contact with Soviets in East Berlin.

(U) 3. Allied Travel Office:

This body is a de facto consular office for issuing visas and was organized in 1946 to issue travel permits to facilitate travel between citizens of Western states wishing to travel in the Soviet Zone and citizens of Eastern States wishing to travel in the Western Zones. It has been operating without a Soviet member since 11 June 1954, when his duties were taken over by consular department of the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin. Soviet citizens wishing to travel in West Germany now apply to the representative of the Federal Republic in Berlin. Therefore this body is quadripartite in name only. Its main function now is to issue permits to citizens of Satellite states wishing to visit West Germany.

(U) 4. Spandau Prison: (British sector)

This prison is maintained solely to house the three remaining major Nazi war criminals, i.e. Rudolph Hess, Albert Speer and Baldur von Schirach. The Western Allies have long sought to remove these three to a smaller institution or to parole them. So far, the Soviets have not agreed. However, these inmates were convicted by a court in which the Soviets participated at Nuremberg 1945-46, and the prison's location in Berlin is accidental. Therefore, the maintenance of this installation is hardly a Berlin occupation function. In view of all the facts, the prison could as well be conducted by the three western allies according to their own policies.

2 (U) 5. Previous Extension of East German Authority in Four-Power Areas

Positive Soviet efforts to extend East German authority over Berlin began shortly after the treaty of sovereignty of September 1955, which ostensibly gave the so-called German Democratic Republic complete control over its internal and external affairs, the borders around Berlin, the national and zonal borders, except those responsibilities retained in the Zorin-Bolz letters, i.e. control over the movement of personnel and goods pertaining to the "garrisons of the three Western Powers" in Berlin.

(U) As early as November 1955, the Soviet Berlin Commandant, General Dibrova asserted that the "GDR" was sovereign in East Berlin when the US Berlin Commandant protested the detention of two congressmen by East Berlin police.

(U) In May 1956, a protest by the Western Missions against the parading of East German Army units and Kampfgruppen in the May Day parade, in violation of four-power agreements, was rejected by the Soviets with the same excuse. Similar protests on later occasions also were rejected. On or about 1 January 1958, the US, British and French missions in Berlin were notified that henceforth they would be required to obtain East German visas to travel in East Germany.

2. (A) Remaining Four-Power Functions in Berlin and extent of previous referral of power to Germans

(U) Taken at face value, the Ulbricht statement of 27 October and Khrushchev's remarks of 10 November, indicate not only an impending surrender of Soviet rights to East Germany, but also the integration of the West and East sectors of Berlin into the East German state. However, assuming that no attempt will be made to accomplish this end by force of arms, we must also assume that the Soviets and their East German puppets ^{might} be temporarily content with allowing West Berlin to exist separately and the Western garrisons to remain there, -- but under terms agreed to with the East Germans. The first overt step in that direction will be to turn over those functions which are practically and theoretically a part of four power administration and control to the East Germans.

(U) In September 1955, the Soviet Union and East Germany entered into a treaty of sovereignty, in which the East Germans were granted full control over their internal and external affairs, including the national and zonal border, and the city borders of Berlin. Supplementing this treaty, Boris the East German Foreign Minister and Zorin, then the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, exchanged letters in which the control over the travel of personnel and the traffic in goods pertaining to the three western garrisons over the Berlin Helmutshof Autobahn, the rail lines and the three air corridors was "temporarily" reserved to the Commander in Chief of the OSFG - until further agreement is reached. Until now, there has been no indication as to who is to be included in the "further agreement."

(U) Following are remaining areas of Soviet control:

1. Rail and Autobahn Check Points:

Here the Soviets can be expected to withdraw from these points and turn over their functions to East Germans.

(U) 2. Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC)

Soviet members can be expected to withdraw, but the center can function without Soviet cooperation. BASC functions as follows:

(U) a. Prior to entry into East Germany military and civil air pilots declare their flight plan in flight to Berlin Air Traffic Control Center (USAFE operated) at Tempelhof.

(U) b. This flight plan is then passed to BASC for information only. However, once flight plan is made known to BASC the Soviet element assumes the responsibility for and guarantees safety of the aircraft.

(U) c. Berlin Air Traffic Control Center is staffed by US Air Force personnel.

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(U) At the same time the Soviets are clearly attempting to raise the issue by referring to the dangers of West German rearmament and to the need for Four Power negotiation of an overall German peace treaty. In attempting to win his points in the past with respect to European security and a reduction of the Western military posture, Khrushchev has consistently followed a course of calling attention to a dangerous situation or development allegedly caused by Western leadership provocation and then pointing out Soviet willingness to negotiate the problem. He appears now to be using the same gambit and to be using the Berlin situation as his lever. He, in effect, is saying that the dangerous Berlin-German rearmament situation calls for Four Power negotiation within the context of European security. This underlines a favorite Soviet thesis that security solutions must precede political solutions. The fact that the Rapacki Plan and a European Friendship Treaty are currently active, Soviet Bloc proposals is probably not simply coincidence.

(U) As far as Soviet courses of action stemming from these general objectives is concerned, it is much easier to surmise what will not occur than what will. Although Bloc consolidation and the diminution of Allied military posture are important goals, neither is sufficiently important to justify a general war or the serious risk of a counter productive political defeat. Hence a total blockade of Berlin, a military attack against Berlin, and a partial blockade as in 1948 are all deemed to be improbable. It does not follow, however, that any military action is improbable. A limited military action, so long as it does not put the Soviets in an aggressive or threatening light and so long as the issue raised is not serious enough to provoke the US into war, would probably be accepted by the Soviets as a demonstration of their point that dangerous tension exists. The turn over of Soviet functions in East Berlin to East Germans is to us a very distinct probability which the Soviets will probably preface with a formal proposal for Allied as well as Soviet turnover in Berlin. Harassment of Allied access to Berlin, using East Germans and the sovereignty issue as levers, will certainly continue.

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Berlin Estimate

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(U) With a view to reaching an understanding of how the Soviets are likely to act and to react in this situation which confronts us, it may be worthwhile to examine what seems to be motivating the Soviets, what appear to be the factors limiting or inhibiting Soviet actions, and what we may expect the general Soviet courses of action to be.

(U) The first thing it would be well to be sure of is what the Soviets and East Germans have actually been saying with regard to Berlin and the "German problem" since Khrushchev's speech of 10 November. We can summarize the most important and relevant statements as follows:

(U) The rearmament of West Germany and the provocative presence of the Allies in Berlin constitute a grave menace to European peace and must hence be eliminated. In addition, the Four Power status of Berlin violates the legitimate rights of the sovereign GDR and for this reason as well must be given up. The Soviets do not intend "to fight against the West" over Berlin but "definite proposals" will be made to the Allies to resolve the problem. [At the same time, the USSR will "tackle immediately" the larger question of a Four Power - German peace treaty which "must be solved primarily by the Four Powers." The Soviet Union, "for its part, will hand over to the sovereign GDR those functions in Berlin which are still exercised by Soviet organs." Moreover, "should any aggressive forces come out against the GDR," the Soviet Union "will consider it as an attack on the Soviet Union." The East Germans offer to be reasonably cooperative in subsequent dealings with the Allies. The East Germans also suggest that in any future resolution of the overall German problem, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany is possible but will "naturally" be conditional upon a similar retreat by Allied forces.

(U) What has motivated the Soviets and East Germans to say these things? What are they getting at? It is obvious of course - and has been obvious for a long time - that the Allied presence in Berlin is a thorn of considerable magnitude in the side of the Soviets and East Germans. One of the Soviets' most important strategic objectives in Europe is to consolidate and stabilize the Bloc situation. This is not possible so long as West Berlin remains in Western hands, a fact which has become increasingly apparent over the past year. It is clear therefore that at least a partial explanation of the current Soviet and East German statements and actions is that they represent the latest in a long history of efforts to eliminate or reduce the seriousness of a very grave weakness. The immediate objective thus would appear to be to induce Allied retreat from Berlin or, at least, to obtain Western recognition of East Germany.

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SITUATION NUMBER 1 SOVIETS WITHDRAW FROM EAST BERLIN

(U)

1. USAREUR Policy:

(U) a. Continue Tripartite Administration of West Berlin including adherence to tripartite access policies.

(U) b. Protest the abolishment of the Soviet Kommandatura and the withdrawal of Soviet Liaison with US forces on the grounds that the action removes the established military channel and point of contact for administration of the Four Power Agreement regarding Berlin. (USCOB and USAREUR protest to SERB or CSFG and STATE through ambassadorial channels.)

(U) c. The US should negotiate with Soviets to continue Soviet guarantee of safe and toll-free access to and from Berlin.

(U) d. Further protests by USCOB or USAREUR will be lodged with the SERB in Berlin if available, otherwise with CSFG at Wuenendorf.

(U) e. A further course of action would be for the Allies to assume, by occupation, if necessary the Administration of East Berlin. This could become an obligation by virtue of Soviet default or inability to carry out the Four Power Agreements regarding Berlin. (See SMC IN 5478, Berlin)

Make West Berlin Government our agents to administer West Berlin remain in military force to support the project.

(U) f. Initiate an aggressive public information program complementary to the course of action selected by the US.

2. Instructions:

(U) a. Request USCOB comments regarding 1d and recommended US unilateral military plans to implement 1e.

(U) b. Message to AMEMB Bruce requesting comment and feasibility of securing tripartite agreement to 1e.

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(U) c. Inform AMEMB Bruce of recommendation in 1b above and request concurrence.

(U) d. Direct Info Div to prepare support plan to implement 1c.

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**SITUATION NUMBER 2 DETENTION BY SOVIETS OR GDR OF A
MILITARY CONVOY**

(U)
1. USAREUR Policy:

(U) a. Follow Tripartite Agreement which consists of a demand for a Soviet Officer showing normal documentation without change of procedures or content to GDR. If passage not granted Protest and then if not cleared follow USAREUR instructions which are to return to point of origin.

(U) b. Protest through the most expeditious channels (USCIB to Karlsruhe/Bonn to Moscow) the illegal detention of US personnel and inform that a senior US officer, accompanied by a MP force is enroute to take command of US personnel and return them to the US sector.

(U) c. Request authority to employ force to extricate should the protest fail to secure the immediate release of personnel and equipment. (This authority was requested by USAREUR on 15 November SX 7691. Request was concurred in by CINCEUR and forwarded to SECDEF for authority on 15 November, EC 9-6071).

(U) d. Until such time as advanced authority to employ force is received instructions to convey commanders should include authority to submit as a last resort to inspection of the convey to insure release without detention. (NOTE: This will subsequently be repudiated by authorities to effect convey commander acted on his own without proper authority).

(U) e. Accept a self-imposed blockade.

(U) f. As an alternate USAREUR could permit the convey and personnel to remain in Soviet/GDR custody in order to exploit public opinion.

(U) g. CINCUSAREUR could exercise the prerogatives of command and make such decisions as necessary to extricate personnel.

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(U)
2. Instructions:

- (U) a. USCOB prepare an operation plan to extricate US personnel and equipment from the Babelsberg checkpoint. (Actually a refinement of outline contained in SX 7695.)
- (U) b. Same requirement to Seventh Army for Heilmstadt.
- (U) c. Amend EP 103 to include extricate mission.
- d. With regard to detention between checkpoints, Seventh Army prepare a plan with two contingencies:
- (U) (1) Utilizing Airborne forces to protect personnel.
- (U) (2) Extricate personnel and equipment by force.
- (U) e. CAD amend convoy commanders instructions to include above.
- (U) f. Draft protest attached.

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7 of 2 Pages

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PROTEST BY USCOB TO GENERAL ZAKHAROV
CINCSFG AT WUENS DORF (U)

GENERAL ZAKHAROV:

(U) I have been informed that US military personnel and equipment have been detained at the Babelsberg checkpoint since _____ hours _____ 1958. This is a criminal act and is in violation of agreements pertaining to Allied Rights of Access to and from Berlin.

(U) I demand their immediate release and have ordered a senior officer and a military police force to go to Babelsberg for the purpose of taking command of and returning US personnel and equipment to the US sector of Berlin.

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**SITUATION NUMBER 3 DETENTION BY SOVIETS OR GDR OF A
MILITARY TRAIN**

(U)

1. USAREUR Policy:

(U)

a. Follow tripartite agreement which consist of a demand for Soviet officer, if passage not granted show normal documentation to GDR (without change in procedure or contents); Protest, and if not cleared follow USAREUR instruction which are to radio facts to USCIB and CINCUSAREUR.

(U)

b. Should a train be detained between the checkpoint and Berlin implement EP 105 to recover personnel, mail and cargo by vehicle (this plan is based upon peaceful entry after permission has been granted by the Soviets).

(U)

c. Without excluding women and children from the Berlin military train, air travel should be made available and dependents encouraged to utilize it.

(U)

d. Unilateral courses of action are the same as in Situation Number 2.

(U)

2. Instructions:

(U)

a. Seventh Army prepare an operational plan to extricate US personnel, mail, and equipment detained at the Soviet rail checkpoint at Mareinborn.

(U)

b. Amend EP 103 to include extricate mission.

(U)

c. CAD amend train command instructions to include id of Situation Number 1.

(U)

d. Trans Div coordinate c above to secure USAFE agreement.

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Situation Number 4 Implementation of Treaty of Sovereignty

(U) Governmental decisions are required prior to development of detailed USAREUR Policy regarding this situation. The Basic proposed U.S. political courses of action are:

(U) — Recognition of GDR.

(U) Use of Armed Forces to maintain the US position in Berlin, preceded by confidential ultimatum by Head of Government.

(U) Accede to a self imposed blockade.

(U) 1. USAREUR proposed policy is stated in cable, USAREUR, EX-7820, Nov 22, par 2(c)5.

(U) 2. USAREUR course of action:

Await further instructions.

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Situation Number 5 East German Control of Air Corridors.

(U) 1. USAREUR Position:

(U) a. Protest interference and continue to hold Soviets responsible for safety of air craft.

(U) b. Continue normal flight operations, clear any obstacles from the ground within our zone, and if necessary after the protest, test the intentions of the Soviets and GDR by providing armed escorts (jet fighters). ✓

(U) c. Ignore the insistence to use Schoenefeld airfield and continue operations into West Berlin. If necessary place military crew aboard US commercial carriers.

(U) 2. Instructions:

(U) a. Recommend to CINCEUR that USAFE be directed to prepare a plan to provide escort aircraft and crews for US commercial carriers.

(U) b. Issue instruction requiring army aircraft to adhere to procedures prescribed by USAFE.

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Situation Number 6 Soviets Withdraw from BASC.

- (U) 1. USAREUR Position:
- (U) a. Protest the Soviet refusal to accept the responsibility for aircraft safety. ✓
 - (U) b. Continue to file flight plans in normal manner and deliver to the vacated Soviet desk.
 - (U) c. Continue normal flight operations, attach armed escorts if necessary to continue operations.
- (U) 2. Instructions:
- (U) a. Inform CINCEUR of proposed action.
 - (U) b. Request CINCEUR direct USAFE to prepare a plan to provide escort aircraft.

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Subject: Block Military Land Line Cables.

(U) 1. USAREUR Policy:

(U) a. Protest interference with internal US communication facilities.

(U) b. Conduct operation via radio.

(U) 2. Instructions.

(U) a. Signal division prepare a plan to install, operate and maintain jam free radio telephone, and teletype facilities between Heidelberg and Berlin. (See attached DF)

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Page # 1 of 1 Pages

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USCOB LOG NO

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

1. (SECRET) Signal Division has taken action to improve the communications potential of Berlin Command in event of emergency. This action is postulated on two assumptions:

a. The landline cable, Frankfurt to Berlin, on which we now rely for the bulk of our communications, could be denied us by the East German Government, without apparent overt intent, such as stating that repeaters were out, etc. This cable has been in continuous use, even during the Berlin Blockade.

b. The radio relay and high frequency radio communications, on which we would depend should the cable go out, could be jammed.

2. To meet circumstances arising from paragraph 1a above, additional channels over the present VHF radio relay system are required both for USAREUR needs and for those which depend upon USAREUR for this service. There are now twenty-eight [word illeg] channels and six (6) teletype channels available on the VHF system. [words illeg] USAFE has requested a minimum of four (4) voice, and four (4) telegraph terminals for their exclusive use in case of emergency with an indication that might be needed. On Monday, 22 November 1958, terminal equipment to provide twelve (12) additional voice channels and eighteen (18) telegraph channels over the present VHF system was air lifted to Berlin. In addition, two (2) more on-line cryptographic equipments were provided for the Berlin Concenter. All equipment is now being installed, with a target date of 29 November 1958 for completion. There is a likelihood that propagation limitations over this circuit will not permit all the additional voice channels. This can only be determined by actual trial.

3. In the event of jamming, possible action includes the provision of [word illeg] radio relay and VHF channels operating on different frequencies from the [word illeg] equipment, and the installation of specially designed anti-jam radio equipment on 21 November 1958, Chief Signal Officer was queried by Staff Service Message, Inclosure 1, on availability of a tropospheric scatter link and of an F9C noise modulation equipment for installation at Berlin to work over HF radio with a similar terminal now installed at Pirmasens. He was also queried regarding the use of the special high frequency radio AN/GRC-98, which was returned from Lebanon and is now being rehabilitated in the Pirmasens Signal Depot. By telecon on 25 November 1958, the Chief Signal Officer advised that F9C equipment would not be available. Authority was granted to use the AN/GRC-98 at Berlin (it normally is reserved for use under the Department of Army STARCOM 1-58 plan), and technical information was provided regarding an available tropospheric scatter system. The following action is being taken with regard to the above:

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ABAX PAC 270 2.5.1 SC

AC/S, G-3

Communications for Berlin (C)

Signal

Col VanHarlingen/8879

(U) ~~SECRET~~ Signal Division has taken action to improve the communications potential of this Center in event of emergency. This action is postulated on two assumptions:

(U) a. The landline cable, Frankfurt to Berlin, on which we now rely for the bulk of our communications, could be denied us by the East German Government, without apparent overt intent, such as stating that repeaters were out, etc. This cable has been in continuous use, even during the Berlin Blockade.

(U) b. The radio relay and high frequency radio communications, on which we would depend should the cable go out, could be jammed.

(U) c. In the event of jamming, additional channels for the present VHF radio relay system are required both for USAREUR needs and for USARF which depends upon USAREUR for this service. There are now twenty-five channels available on the VHF system. USAREUR has requested a minimum of four (4) voice, and four (4) telegraph channels for their exclusive use in case of emergency with an indication that more might be needed. On Monday, 24 November 1958, terminal equipment to provide twelve (12) additional voice channels and eighteen (18) telegraph channels over the present VHF system was air lifted to Berlin. In addition, two (2) more on-line cryptographic equipments were provided for the Berlin Comcenter. All equipment is now being installed, with a target date of 25 November 1958 for completion. There is a likelihood that propagation limitations over this circuit will not permit all the additional voice channels. This can only be determined by actual trial.

(U) 3. ~~SECRET~~ In the event of jamming, possible action includes the provision of a separate radio relay and HF channels operating on different frequencies from the present equipment, and the installation of specially designed anti-jam radio equipment. On 21 November 1958, Chief Signal Officer was queried by Staff Service Message, Inclosure 1, on availability of a tropospheric scatter link and of an F9C noise modulation equipment for installation at Berlin to work over HF radio with a similar terminal now installed at Pirmasens. He was also queried regarding the use of a special high frequency radio AN/GRC-98, which was returned from Lebanon and is now being rehabilitated in the Pirmasens Signal Depot. By telecon on 25 November 1958, the Chief Signal Officer advised that F9C equipment would not be available. Authority was granted to use the AN/GRC-98 at Berlin (it normally is reserved for use under the Department of Army STARCUM 1-58 Plan), and technical information was provided regarding an available tropospheric scatter system. The following action is being taken with regard to the above:

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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

a. Rehabilitation of the AN/GRC-98 being expedited on an overtime basis with a completion date of 30 November 1958 expected. Site survey is [line illog] provides four (4) teletype channels.

b. Survey is being conducted in Berlin for siting of a tropospheric scatter terminal. It should be understood that the tropospheric scatter operation will largely provide manipulative latitude to operate at a different frequency in case of jamming, but in itself offers little in terms of intrinsic anti-jam characteristics.

c. A frequency study is being conducted to provide the broadest choice to Berlin in case of jamming. When all frequencies possible have been obtained for this use, an SCP will be provide for evasive action.

4. Barring the use of sophisticated anti-jam equipment, the most positive means of communicating through jamming will be by use of CW operation, using maximum power. A survey of available operators is now being conducted in order to earmark the most proficient for use on the Berlin circuit in case of emergency. There are only six (6) of the special anti-jamming equipments available for the army and all are installed at major ASAR stations throughout the world.

5. In executing of the above program, 53,000 DM's have already being provided to Berlin Command for procurement of special companders for use on [word illog] circuits and \$1,500 overtime money has been committed for rehabilitation of the GRC-98. Estimate that \$37,500 in addition will be required for transportation and installation of the tropospheric scatter and the AN/GRC-98 equipment. Ten (10) extra people will be needed to operate and maintain the additional equipment in Berlin. The exact source of this personnel has not been determined. On a temporary basis, they will be borrowed largely from the 4th Signal Group. On a long term basis, additional personnel spaces will be needed for the Berlin Command.

6. This document may be regarded CONFIDENTIAL on 25 November 1961.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(U)
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Communications for Berlin

(U) a. Rehabilitation of the AN/GRC-98 is being expedited on an overtime basis with a completion date of 30 November 1961 expected. Site survey is being conducted at the site of the AN/GRC-98. The site survey provides four (4) teletype channels.

(U) b. Survey is being conducted in Berlin for the siting of a tropospheric scatter terminal. It should be understood that the tropospheric scatter operation will largely provide manipulative latitude to operate at a different frequency in case of jamming, but in itself offers little in terms of intrinsic anti-jam characteristics.

(U) c. A frequency study is being conducted to provide the broadest choice to Berlin in case of jamming. When all frequencies possible have been obtained for this use, an SOP will be provided for evasive action.

(U) d. ~~(SECRET)~~ Barring the use of sophisticated anti-jam equipment, the most positive means of communicating through jamming will be by use of CW operation, using maximum power. A survey of available operators is now being conducted in order to earmark the most proficient for use on the Berlin circuit in case of emergency. There are only six (6) of the special anti-jamming equipment available in the Army and all are located at major ACAL stations throughout the world.

(U) e. ~~(SECRET)~~ In execution of the above program, 53,000 DM's have already been allocated to Berlin for procurement of special computers for use on the AN/GRC-98 and 12,500 DM's have been committed for rehabilitation of the AN/GRC-98. Estimate that 33,500 DM's in addition will be required for transportation and installation of the tropospheric scatter and the AN/GRC-98 equipment. (10) extra people will be needed to operate and maintain the additional equipment in Berlin. The exact source of this personnel has not been determined. On a temporary basis, they will be borrowed largely from the 4th Signal Group. On a long term basis, additional personnel spaces will be needed for the Berlin circuit.

(U) (UNCLASSIFIED) This document may be regraded CONFIDENTIAL on 1 November 1961.

FOR THE SIGNAL OFFICER:

Staff Svc
Crypto Bravo 165 (S)

W. M. VAN HARTINGEN, Col, SigC
Chief, Plans & Opns Branch

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~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

Situation Number 8 Apprehension of US Military Personnel.

(U) 1. USAREUR Policy:

- (U) a. Refuse to recognize or negotiate with GDR.
- (U) b. USCOB protest retention of US personnel to CSFG headquarters and attempt to secure their release. Protest on Soviet Ambassador and governmental level to follow.
- (U) c. Place East Berlin "off limits" to US Military Personnel.
- (U) d. Publicize Soviet actions in press.
- (U) e. If release not made in a reasonable time, then solicit services of the Red Cross or other appropriate international agency.

(U) 2. Instructions:

- (U) a. CAD should be directed to prepare a briefing for delivery to US military personnel prior to their visit to East Berlin. The briefing should cover standards of conduct and possible personal consequences to an arrest by East German Policy.
- (U) b. Amend our request for authority to extricate personnel at checkpoints to include those arrested and held in East Berlin after positive location has been determined.
- (U) c. USCOB comments and recommendation regarding 1c and capability to Brief personnel as per 2a have been requested.

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Page # 1 of 1 Pages

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USCOB LOG NO

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SUMMARY, RECOMMENDED PRINCIPLES, BERLIN ACTION

- (U) 1. Our existing rights in Berlin, including access by air, rail, and autobahn, must be reaffirmed ^{to} with the Soviets in the event any change in control or procedure is contemplated by the USSR. This includes such measures, on the part of the USSR, as relinquishing previous Soviet responsibilities to the GDR.
- (U) 2. The US position should be based on an agreed tripartite position, and should reflect tripartite determination to use force, to the degree necessary, to maintain these existing rights.
- (U) 3. Our position with respect to the use of force should follow these lines:
 - (U) a. Access by air corridor, as the easiest to maintain, should include the implementation of the "Garrison Airlift" under ~~inter-convertible~~ ground security of Tempelhof Airport as necessary.
 - (U) b. In the event that overland access, by rail or autobahn, is denied, i.e., convoys or trains are physically detained at either Check Point, we must have the authority, the plans, and the means for recovering the personnel and essential equipment by the use of "riot squads" supported by tactical elements.
 - (U) c. In the event that a convoy or train is physically detained between check points we must have the authority, the plans, and means for the protection and the recovery of the personnel and essential equipment. This would involve the violation of air corridors and might bring about a Soviet or GDR reaction leading to limited or general conflict. For this, we must be militarily prepared.
 - (U) d. Our chances of success, in b and c above, are better by trying at West German exits.

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Soviets have prefaced their unilateral turnover" etc.

(U) 12) Page 6 (section c) the Soviets have already stated that the East Germans will not be acting for them as "deputies" but rather entirely "sovereign" on their own. This has led to our changing our contingency planning re "agency theory". Soviets have also stated in most recent declarations that it is their intention to effect this turnover within the next six months and consequently the entire section "c" might be eliminated.

(U) 13) Page 6 (section 3(J) - USMER believes it doubtful that a blockade against flow of West German goods and person would be initiated at the time of the Soviet "turnover". But USMER believes it possible such a blockade might later be instituted.

(U) 14) Page 9 (situation 5, top of page) mention might also be made that Soviets or East Germans have proposed that East German Lufthansa Airline be granted reciprocal routes to respective countries.

(U) 15) Re USAREUR policy recommendations with respect to various "situations" USMER has made recommendations with respect to certain of these contingencies to the American Embassy at Bonn and to the Department of State, with copies to USAREUR. It is understood that policy to cover many of these "situations" is currently under study between the Departments of State and Defense in Washington.

(U) USMER wishes, however, to make specific comment in these instances:

(U) a) USAREUR Policy Paper, Situation #2, page 1, USAREUR Policy re detention by Soviets of military convey (para. b), USMER would suggest including here that an approach on the political level (either Karlsruhe if possible or if not, in Bonn) should be made before use of force is threatened. This was done in the case of the incident of November 14 and proved successful.

(U) b) Situation #4, page 1, "Implementation of Treaty of Sovereignty" lists as possible U.S. action the "recognition of GDR". This action is opposed by USMER, the American Embassy Bonn and the Department of State.

(U) c) Situation #5 "East German control of air corridors", section b, believe notation should be added that Allied civilian pilots enroute to or from Berlin should be notified as soon as the Soviets leave NASC. This suggestion has been under recent review both in Berlin and Bonn.

WBK/hlm

Contributors:

Findley Burns, Jr.
K. B. Jenkins

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901030 -167

USCOB - Colonel Johnson

USBER:POL - William B. Kelly

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Comments on Berlin Situation Working Paper. (U)

(U) USBER officers have reviewed the Berlin Estimate working paper and agree that it basically sets forth the problem now facing the Allies. However, the following suggested additions or changes are offered for your consideration:

(U) 1) Page 1 (third para.), insert following beginning phrase, "In addition--the Western Powers no longer have any legal basis for continued occupation of West Berlin because they have violated the Potsdam Agreement by permitting and abetting the resurgence of German militarism and Nazism".

(U) 2) Page 1 (third para), it is questionable if in view of recent Soviet pronouncements the sentence reading "At the same time, the USSR will 'tackle immediately' the larger question of a Four Power - German peace treaty which 'must be solved primarily by the Four Powers'" need be included.

(U) 3) Page 1 (third para), change the phrase "come out against" to "attack".

(U) 4) Page 2 (second para), USBER does not consider a partial blockade as in 1948 as improbable -- certainly not to the degree that a military attack against Berlin, would be.

(U) 5) Page 2 (bottom of page) suggest deleting phrase in second last sentence commencing "which the Soviets will probably preface with a formal proposal for Allied as well as Soviet turnover in Berlin". Actually the turnover of the functions referred to has already been proposed.

(U) 6) Page 3 (first para., 6th line), change word "will" to "might".

(U) 7) Page 3 (last sentence) prior to breakdown Soviet areas of control-- phrase "as to who is to be included" unclear. Might be changed to "what".

(U) 8) Page 4 (between sections 4 and 5), mention should also be made here of the continued presence of Polish and Czech Military Missions in West Berlin as vestiges of period when Soviet influence exerted in West Berlin.

(U) 9) Page 5 (3.(8) a.(1). It has already been agreed in Berlin that once the Soviets "turn over" their responsibilities to the GDR Allied personnel should be permitted to visit East Berlin only with the permission of senior U.S. officials (USBER telegram 298 to Bonn, repeated 99 to USARUR).

(U) 10) Page 5 (3.(8) a) phrase "extend East German's 'sovereignty' to East Berlin" could be eliminated as Soviets have already done this.

(U) 11) Page 6 (top, section b.) change tense so that sentence reads "the
/Soviets

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